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‘K’ IS FOR . . .
SØREN KIERKEGAARD (1813-1855) 
Søren Kierkegaard (or ‘SK’ to follow the customary abbreviation used by many of his interpreters and 
biographers), Danish writer in poetic forms, philosophy, psychology, and Christian devotion, has been 
called the father of existentialism.   
MORALIZED TIME LINE.  We can well imagine that, in his youth-span, SK experienced conscience activity 
at turns heightened and suppressed. Notably heightened activity would likely have occurred:  during his 
struggle with the revelation of his origin that accompanied his father’s confession of infidelity and in the 
course of successive losses --his mother as well as five siblings—before the end of his adolescence. 
There was repudiation of his strict religious upbringing, then demoralization and suppression of 
conscience activity during his resort to desperate hedonism in young adulthood. A matter of conscience, 
too, was his love for Regina Olsen and the deliberations that eventuated in breaking his engagement 
with her. His JOURNALS are indicative of persistent bouts of depression in life sometimes with 
deliberations on suicidality. As late as 1848 he writes, progressing from past to present tense:  
It is terrible when I think, even for a single moment, over the dark background which, from the 
very earliest time, was part of my life. The dread with which my father filled my soul, his own 
frightful melancholy, and all the things in this connection which I do not even note down. I felt 
dread of Christianity and yet myself so strongly drawn towards it…. (JOURNALS, p. 149) 
Accordingly, his leap of faith and acceptance of the Christian call to love must be regarded as the matter 
of conscience ultimately most crucial to him.  Subsequently, we find conscience in his decisions and 
renewed vows to devote himself to writing and publishing and again in his activist undertaking of a 
sustained polemic that he would consolidate in his work, ATTACK UPON “CHRISTENDOM”. The attack 
earned him personal ridicule and estrangement from the established Danish Church. 
CONSCIENCE RELEVANT WORKS.  SK wrote his JOURNALS and Christian Reflections and Discourses in his 
own name but adopted pseudonyms for his poetical, psychological and philosophical works.  In his 
JOURNALS, SK indicates that his intent is to underscore that with each pseudonym, he is taking a certain 
point of view or perspective, offering both the advantages and disadvantages of a limited scope. In 
EITHER/OR (EO), for example, the author contrasts the aesthetic and the putatively moral views of life. 
The reader should not be deceived into thinking that a particular pseudonym represents what SK 
declares to be his final point of view, found in his Christian Reflections and Discourses, preeminently, 
WORKS OF LOVE (WL).  SK’s device of having pseudonyms characterize positions and perspectives 
demands an inter-textual approach drawing from contributions over his own signature. The close reader 
heeding the demand is ‘rewarded’ –so to speak –with a disorienting and disturbing display of moral 
imagination. The reader will be tasked with deep engagement in his or her own moral imagination, as 
well.  
CONSCIENCE STAGES. In STAGES ON LIFE’S WAY the author identifies aesthetic, moral and religious 
stages of lived experience. For each stage the author identifies an exemplar: Don Juan, Socrates and 
Abraham, respectively. He raises Socrates as an exemplar of the ethical and, probably also, what one 
pseudonym terms, of Religiousness A. Abraham is certainly identified and esteemed as the father of 
faith. 
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CONSCIENCE DOMAINS. To better approximate SK’s conceptualization of conscience, we must first of all 
discern what SK believes conscience is not. This inevitably draws us into SK’s often polemical reaction to 
the philosophy of Hegel.  In Hegel’s speculative system the higher ethical life is mediated from opposing 
factors: the subjective will of the conscientious individual, on the one hand and objective norms, on the 
other. Hegel calls both of these abstract. In Hegel’s system, they belong to the intermediate sphere of 
morality (Moralität) a transitional moment in dialectical movement to higher ethical life (Sittlichkeit), 
which Hegel calls concrete universal or absolute (Collins, 1967).  
 
Conceptualization of Conscience: While SK deliberately intends the pseudonymous author of FEAR AND 
TREMBLING (FT), Johannes de silentio not provide direct communication on the uniquely Christian 
positions that SK will make explicit in WL, Johannes nonetheless take an anti-Hegelian position that 
captures SK’s view of an intimate relationship between religious faith in general and conscience, each 
only to be understood, not as concrete universal or absolute but rather as passionate features of human 
subjectivity embedded in the particular individual.  
 
Moralized Attachment: While religious-moral choosing (via the leap of faith) is pre-eminent in SK’s 
poetical, psychological and philosophical works, he emphasizes the unmet demands of moralized 
connectedness in the reflective Christian discourse WL.  Every relationship including marriage (the 
possibility of which SK rejected on his life’s way) occurs in a tri-personal field involving God as well as 
human beings who are commanded to love one another. On SK’s view, the God relationship has priority 
over erotic or any other form of love by secular description. 
    
 Moral Emotional Responsiveness: Familiar moral-emotionally charged words are abundant in SK’s 
writings and are featured in the titles of the poetical work FT and the psychological work THE CONCEPT 
OF DREAD.  However terms of discrete emotion and mood are eclipsed by his use of the dispositional 
term, passion. After all is said and done, in SK’s view, conscience subserves faith but shares with faith 
the characteristic of being passionate inwardness.  Moral emotional responsiveness is not a neat 
cognitive process; it entails a pure heart.  In WL, there is a sustained reflection (WL IIIB) entitled “Love Is 
a Matter of Conscience” which expands upon I Timothy 1:5: “The aim of our charge is love that issues 
from a pure heart and a good conscience and sincere faith.”  We encounter a continuous dynamic of 
reparation and healing, in the forms of confession, penitence, indebtedness and forgiveness (Hall, 2002). 
    
 Moral Valuation:  The moral stage as depicted in EO and SWL is fairly consonant with Kant’s 
deontological ethics and the idea of the categorical imperative, but SK insists that, in Christ, ethics are 
transformed into a constant striving (immer strebend) to love God and neighbor that, as Theologian and 
Ethicist Amy Laura Hall puts it, “undermine a description of duty met.” Keeping in mind that SK embeds 
conscience in particular subjectivity, conscience can be understood to work by illuminating and 
convicting with respect to immediate vicious impulses (e.g., those of the aesthete and The Seducer in 
EO) but also the guises of self-deception (e.g., those of Judge William in EO). Conscience, properly 
functioning, repetitively applies a kind of VALUE MATRIX that undermines any confidence we may have 
that we ever fulfill “our duty to be in the debt of love to each another” and that we ever achieve, let 
alone sustain, relationships with others according to God’s requirement. Removing self-deceptions, 
conscience readies the individual to stand alone before God, in the recognition of inevitable sin, in 
humility, willing to remain in infinite debt to the one who pays for sin.   
Tolerance: SK deliberates seriously up on what he calls paganism. SK’s occasional remarks on 
perceptions attributed to persons outside Christianity regarding the folly, blasphemy, offense, scandal, 
stumbling block etc. of the Absolute Paradox of Christianity might be construed to reveal keen sensitivity 
to, and even sympathy with, non-Christian religious- moral perspectives on the demands of Christian 
love, but he has no tolerance for attempts in philosophy to treat religious faith as a moment to be 
sublated in a dialectical system. 
Justice: While SK recognizes social injustice, on his view Christianity never seeks to make changes in 
externals, “…has not wanted to hurl governments from the throne in order to set itself on the throne; in 
an external sense it has never striven for a place in the world, for it is not of this world (for in the heart 
room, if it finds a place there, it still takes no position in the world.” (WL, p. 137)—seemingly a 
repudiation of any tendencies in his time towards what would now be called radical or liberation 
Christology.  Something of SK’s awareness of the violation of women’s rights, however, can be 
discerned.  “What abominations has the world not seen in the relationship between man and woman –
that she, almost like an animal, was a despised creature compared to the male, a creature of another 
species! What battles there have been to establish women on equal terms with men in the secular 
world!” (WL, p. 139) SK (as distinguished from his character Judge William who abhors emancipation of 
women) does not appear to be absolutely opposed to redress by secular reforms, but his Christian view 
is that men and women are equal in what ultimately concerns them, that is their relationship to God. 
“Foolish men have foolishly busied themselves in the name of Christianity to make it obvious to the 
world that women have equal rights with men—Christianity has never demanded or desired this. It has 
done everything for woman if she Christianly will be satisfied with being Christian. If she will not, for her 
loss she gains only a mediocre compensation in the little fragmentary externals she can win by worldly 
threats.” (WL, p. 140)   
 
Moralized Autonomy/Volition:   
 Ideally speaking it may be perfectly true that every man should be given freedom of conscience 
 and freedom of belief, etc…. Now everyone wants to do away with all constraint, so as to play 
 the apostle – which is like doing away with cannon, powder, and bayonet and then wanting to 
 be a very brave soldier. In order that it be conscience alone that decides…it is necessary to have 
 opposition and constraint. The qualification “conscience” is so inward that it requires the very 
 finest filters in order to discover it….The man who can really stand alone in the world, only 
 taking counsel from his conscience—that man is a hero….” [JOURNALS (in Bretall, pp 428-429)]. 
In FT, SK approaches the incomprehensibility of faith’s demand upon conscience. He does this by visiting 
and revisiting the story of Abraham and Isaac on Mount Moriah, a motif powerful, shocking and subject 
to conflicting interpretations, and, perhaps, defying any (merely human) interpretation at all. Loving 
father and beloved son are instructed by God to ready themselves for a sacrifice. Only Abraham knows 
that God has further instructed him that his son will be the one sacrificed. To describe this experience 
and impress upon his reader Abraham’s suffering over this divine command and his love for Isaac, SK 
coins the phrase “religious horror”.  
Demoralization and harm prevention: Especially in SICKNESS UNTO DEATH, we are able to infer that SK 
counteracted suicidality by retrieval of his life affirming religious values. SK would have attributed to 
God’s Grace, rather than to any efforts of his own, the turnarounds that must have occurred repeatedly 
for him to survive his self-destructive urges and melancholy dispositions.   
However, he completed the 1848 JOURNAL entry cited above this way: “How true are the words I have 
so often said to myself, that as Scheherazade saved her life by telling fairy-stories I save my life, or keep 
myself alive by writing.” So, then; writing, we must understand was, for SK, a key survival strategy.  
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About this Work 
Margaret M. Gaffney & Matthew R. Galvin, editors. An Encyclopedia of Conscience. IU Conscience 
Project. Accessible from: https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/27074. 
Since 2001, our Conscience Project meetings have regularly included lively discussions and applications 
of the conceptual framework of conscience theory - stages, domains and bedrock/intrinsic values – to 
the ideas we are studying in ethics, neuroscience, education, philosophy, psychology and theology. Early 
on, Dr. Barbara Stilwell compiled an alphabetical list of authors who may or may not have been explicit 
about conscience, but who deeply influenced our theory of conscience as it evolved, and recently, we 
have begun to apply the same conscience-sensitive approaches to character/author analyses in the 
histories, biographies, and other literature, fact and fiction, we are reading.  We are excited to see how 
these unique conscience-sensitive approaches can enrich our own writing and teaching in humanistic 
medicine, general humanities, and specifically, moral education.  The brief entries in this Encyclopedia 
of Conscience are not meant to be full biographies, but rather to provide an imaginative sketch of the 
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